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NOTE
“It’s Not You, It’s Your Caseload”: Using Cronic to
Solve Indigent Defense Underfunding
Samantha Jaffe*
In the United States, defendants in both federal and state prosecutions have
the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. That right is in jeop-
ardy. In the postconviction setting, the standard for ineffective assistance of
counsel is prohibitively high, and Congress has restricted federal habeas re-
view. At trial, severe underfunding for state indigent defense systems has led
to low pay, little support, and extreme caseloads—which combine to create
conditions where lawyers simply cannot represent clients adequately. Over-
worked public defenders and contract attorneys represent 80 percent of state
felony defendants annually. Three out of four countywide public defender sys-
tems and fifteen out of twenty-two statewide public defender systems operate
with yearly caseloads that are significantly higher than the ABA recommends.
This Note argues that courts should utilize the procedural ineffectiveness pre-
sumption that the Supreme Court made available in United States v. Cronic
to find state defense counsel carrying caseloads above the ABA-recommended
maximums constitutionally ineffective. Thus, defendants could not be tried
until caseloads in the locality fell within the maximums. This would incen-
tivize state and local legislatures to spend more money on indigent defense.
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Introduction
Frederick Bell was arrested in October 2016 in Louisiana after police
officers alleged “they found drugs in his car during a traffic stop.”1 He says
he met with his attorney, a public defender, for five minutes after his arrest.2
In November, Mr. Bell saw his attorney again, in court, where he was told
about his plea offer.3 His trial was set for April 2017.4 On March 10th, less
than a month before trial was set to begin, he still had not discussed his case
with his attorney.5
Mr. Bell’s circumstances are not unusual. The lack of adequate funding
for indigent defense is well known and well documented. Extreme caseloads
stemming from inadequate funding prompted the director of the Missouri
State Public Defender System to appoint6 the governor to a capital case in
2016.7 In Mississippi, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund con-
ducted an in-depth survey of indigent defense in 2003.8 The report revealed
that indigent defendants in state court were waiting for months in jail before
being ushered through mass guilty pleas (groups of defendants that plead
guilty together with little or no legal consultation).9 In Louisiana, indigent
defendants wait weeks, months, and possibly years for an available public
defender to take their case.10 The lucky ones, like Frederick Bell, wait to be
1. Debbie Elliott, Public Defenders Hard to Come By in Louisiana, NPR (Mar. 10, 2017,
5:29 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/03/10/519211293/public-defenders-hard-tocome-by-in-





6. All that Missouri law requires for a defense attorney is to be a lawyer in “good stand-
ing” with the state bar. See Employment, Mo. St. Pub. Defender, http://www.publicdefender
.mo.gov/employment/employment.htm [https://perma.cc/K8BT-6X4T].
7. Kristen Taketa, Missouri’s Head Public Defender Assigns Case to Gov. Nixon, Cites
Overburdened Staff, St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Aug. 3, 2016), http://www.stltoday.com/news/
local/state-and-regional/missouri-s-head-public-defender-assigns-case-to-gov-nixon/article_3
7809be0-b7ee-56b4-b478-bf8dfe01720f.html [https://perma.cc/YZ7H-B3BA]. The storm of lit-
igation surrounding the public defense crisis in Missouri has led, most recently, to a ruling
from the Missouri Supreme Court forbidding the State Public Defender System from refusing
cases without judicial approval. Jennifer Moore, Public Defender ‘Perplexed’ By High Court
Ruling on Caseloads, KSMU (Oct. 25, 2017), http://ksmu.org/post/public-defender-perplexed-
high-court-ruling-caseloads#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/5AQT-HB2V].




9. Id. at 9.
10. See Lauren Zanolli, Louisiana’s Public Defender Crisis Is Leaving Thousands Stuck in
Jail with No Legal Help, Vice (May 13, 2016, 1:20 PM), https://news.vice.com/article/louisianas
-public-defender-crisis-is-leaving-thousands-stuck-in-jail-with-no-legal-help [https://perma
.cc/6W5R-2C3R].
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contacted by their lawyers while out on bond; the unlucky ones wait in jail.11
On February 6, 2017, the Southern Poverty Law Center filed a class action
suit on behalf of plaintiffs denied a meaningful defense in Louisiana.12 The
pleading alleges that chronic underfunding has led to a complete failure of
the indigent defense system in the state, denying defendants equal protec-
tion, due process, and the basic right to effective assistance of counsel.13
Systemic underfunding leads to high caseloads managed by too few at-
torneys. In 2000, more than 80 percent of people charged with felonies in
state court in the United States were indigent.14 In 2007, three out of every
four county-funded15 public defender offices in the country faced caseloads
higher than the maximum ABA recommendations (150 felonies or 400 mis-
demeanors per full-time attorney per year).16 Fifteen out of twenty-two
state17 defender systems also operated with caseloads that exceeded national
standards.18 That same year, individual lawyers in Florida faced caseloads of
over 500 felonies and 2,225 misdemeanors.19 In Tennessee, six attorneys were
responsible for over 10,000 misdemeanor cases.20 On February 17, 2017, the
ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants released a
11. Elliott, supra note 1.
12. The suit was filed in conjunction with the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law, Davis, Polk, & Wardell LLP, and Jones Walker LLP. SPLC, Allies File Lawsuit over
Louisiana Broken Public Defender System, Southern Poverty L. Ctr. (Feb. 6, 2017), https://
www.splcenter.org/news/2017/02/06/splc-allies-file-lawsuit-over-louisianas-broken-public-de-
fender-system [https://perma.cc/AZ8V-72K8].
13. Verified Petition for Class Certification and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Allen
v. Edwards, No. 655079 (La. 19th Jud. Dist. Ct. Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.courthousenews
.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/JOSEPH-ALLEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9R4-ABCM].
14. Caroline Wolf Harlow, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
NCJ 179023, Defense Counsel in Criminal Cases 1 (2000), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/dccc.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3Q6-H8XX].
15. State public defense systems are usually either funded at the county or state level. For
example, New York has countywide public defender offices (along with a slew of nonprofits
that serve New York City specifically), while Colorado has a statewide system (public defenders
are assigned to branch offices in different cities but are all part of the same “office”). Holly R.
Stevens et al., Ctr. for Justice, Law & Soc’y at George Mason Univ., County and
Local Expenditures for Indigent Defense Services: Fiscal Year 2008, at 5, 17, 48–49
(2010), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_de
fendants/ls_sclaid_def_expenditures_fy08.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/9H76-HNFH]
(surveying funding for indigent defense state by state).
16. Laurence A. Benner, Am. Constitution Soc’y for Law & Policy, When Exces-
sive Public Defender Workloads Violate the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
Without a Showing of Prejudice 1 n.2 (2011), https://www.acslaw.org/files/BennerIB_Ex
cessivePD_Workloads.pdf [https://perma.cc/PN7V-XE4L]. The ABA maximums are based on
recommendations made by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals (NAC) in 1973. See infra Section II.B.
17. See supra note 15.
18. Benner, supra note 16, at 1 n.2.
19. Id. at 1.
20. Id.
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report21 that showed that, in order to “reasonably handle” the 150,000 cases
assigned to public defenders each year, Louisiana would need 1,769 full time
attorneys.22 Currently, it has 363.23
In spite of alarming caseloads in many localities, significantly less
money is often allocated to indigent defense than to the corresponding pros-
ecutors’ offices.24 In New York City, the 2016 budget for the city’s five dis-
trict attorneys was $331.4 million.25 The 2016 budget for public defense was
$250.6 million, over $80 million less.26 And in Washtenaw County, Michi-
gan, the 2016 adopted budget allocated $2.9 million to the public defender
and $5.9 million to the prosecuting attorney, a discrepancy of $3 million.27
The discrepancies in funding between prosecution and defense are legal:
states get to allocate funding however they choose. The numbers are particu-
larly egregious, however, in light of the fact that public defense budgets pay
for lawyers, investigators, and, in some offices, social workers and civil attor-
neys.28 Prosecutors’ offices, in contrast, pay for lawyers and victim’s advo-
cates, but investigation is conducted by local, state, and sometimes federal
law enforcement—all entities with their own working budgets. There is no
federal or state law that mandates “adequate” levels of indigent defense
21. Postlethwaite & Netterville, APAC & Am. Bar Ass’n Standing Comm. on Le-
gal Aid & Indigent Defendants, The Louisiana Project (2017), https://www.americanbar
.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_louisiana_pro
ject_report.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TX7-5NH7].
22. Malia Brink, Still Under Water: Louisiana’s Public Defense System in Crisis, Crim.
Just., Summer 2017, at 45, 45.
23. Id.
24. Some scholars have identified lack of parity as the root of the problem. See Am. Bar
Ass’n Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, Ten Principles of a Pub-
lic Defense Delivery System 1 (2002), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ad-
ministrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam
.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4JJ-GXQL] (“There [should be] parity between defense counsel and
the prosecution with respect to resources . . . .”); Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for
Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 219 (2004) (arguing
for resource parity, but suggesting it may come from legislative action without court
intervention).
25. Ellen Eng, Council of the City of N.Y., Fin. Div., Report on the Fiscal 2016
Preliminary Budget: The District Attorneys and Office of Special Narcotics Prose-
cutor 1 (2015), https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2015/06/fy2016-
da.pdf [https://perma.cc/MRK4-RAK7].
26. Eisha N. Wright, Council of the City of N.Y., Fin. Div., Report on the Fiscal
2016 Preliminary Budget: Courts and Legal Aid Society/Indigent Defense Services 2
(2015), https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2015/06/fy2016-courts.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D6CW-5FSW].
27. Washtenaw Cty., 2014–17 Budget Summary (2013), http://www.ewashtenaw.org/
government/departments/finance/budget/final-budget-2014-2017 [https://perma.cc/QYZ3-
RPR8].
28. Offices that model the “holistic” approach to public defense often have social work-
ers and housing, immigration, family law, and public benefits attorneys on staff. See, e.g.,
Holistic Defense, Defined, Bronx Defenders, https://www.bronxdefenders.org/holistic-de
fense/ [https://perma.cc/96AY-6FBD].
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funding. The lack of funding mandates means no real, enforceable limit on
caseloads for defense attorneys, regardless of the national ABA maximums.
Chronic underfunding and high caseloads in indigent defense matter
because they are tied to effective assistance of counsel. Practitioners and
professors who specialize in criminal defense agree that underfunding leads
to too few lawyers,29 excessive caseloads,30 delays in meeting with clients,31
and assembly-line guilty pleas.32 Constitutionally effective assistance is im-
possible when attorneys face caseloads like those in Florida, Tennessee, or
Louisiana.
The Supreme Court has recognized the right to an attorney since 193233
and the right to effective assistance since 1984.34 In the current ineffective
assistance of counsel landscape, however, there is no way to allege that
chronic underfunding directly leads to ineffective assistance. There’s a gap
between the violation of the right and the remedy. Defendants are forced to
plead ineffective assistance on a case-by-case basis after the fact, even though
most are represented by trial attorneys with caseloads that are too high for
effective representation of any individual client.
This Note seeks to close that gap. Part I lays out the current landscape
for ineffective assistance claims. Part II proposes that state courts use the
framework for procedurally ineffective assistance recognized by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Cronic35 to find counsel procedurally ineffective
when caseloads are higher than the national ABA maximums. Part III de-
scribes how procedural ineffectiveness claims would incentivize state and lo-
cal governments to bring caseloads into compliance with the ABA
maximums and fleshes out counterarguments to the proposal.
I. Background: The Right to (Effective Assistance of) Counsel
In 1962, a man in a Florida jail cell wrote a note to the justices of the
United States Supreme Court.36 He was serving a five-year state sentence on
29. Adam M. Gershowitz, Raise the Proof: A Default Rule for Indigent Defense, 40 Conn.
L. Rev. 85, 92–93 (2007).
30. Id. at 93–94.
31. Id. at 94–95.
32. Id. at 95–96.
33. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
34. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
35. 466 U.S. 648 (1984). Lack of adequate preparation could be presumed if the attor-
ney’s caseload exceeded the maximums recommended by the ABA. The presumption alone
would be enough for a procedural ineffectiveness claim to be granted with no need to examine
the prejudice prong in Strickland.
36. Jaeah Lee et al., Charts: Why You’re in Deep Trouble if You Can’t Afford a Lawyer,
Mother Jones (May 6, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/pub-
lic-defenders-gideon-supreme-court-charts/ [https://perma.cc/G9KR-RLAL].
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charges of breaking into a pool hall and petty larceny.37 He represented him-
self at trial because he couldn’t afford a lawyer.38 A year later, in 1963, that
note led to the requirement that a lawyer be appointed for all felony defend-
ants39 in state court, even those who lack the ability to pay.40
This Part will discuss the underpinnings of the constitutional right to
counsel and the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Defense
attorneys, per the Supreme Court, are “necessities, not luxuries.”41 Implicit
within Gideon v. Wainwright, the case described above, are the ideas that
guilt should not be determined by poverty and that the guarantee of counsel
is necessary to prevent the miscarriage of justice.42 Gideon relied on an egali-
tarian conception of the adversarial system: the Sixth Amendment requires a
lawyer for all felony defendants because it requires that two sides zealously
advocate to protect the principle of innocent until proven guilty.43
Gideon didn’t write on a clean slate. Though it was the first case to
interpret the Sixth Amendment as providing a right to counsel for defend-
ants in state court, it wasn’t the first to find a constitutional right to counsel.
Powell v. Alabama was the first case to identify a constitutional right to
counsel, relying on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.44
Nine young black men were accused of raping two white women.45 The three
trials took one day, and all nine men were sentenced to death.46 The lawyers
appointed to represent them did not consult with any of their clients.47 The
Court held that the convictions could not stand.48 The right to counsel en-
compassed more than a lawyer during trial49—it included a lawyer during
the “critical period of the proceedings . . . when consultation, thoroughgo-
ing investigation and preparation were vitally important.”50
Powell’s conception of the right to counsel stands diametrically opposed
to current state indigent defense systems across the country. Clients are met
just before arraignment or go unrepresented in arraignments, defendants
choose between lawyers with incredibly high caseloads or no lawyer at all,
37. Id.
38. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 337 (1963).
39. Later cases extended this to misdemeanor defendants as well. See Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
40. Previously, the Supreme Court held the Sixth Amendment was not incorporated to
the states, so the rights contained were only applicable to federal defendants in federal court
proceedings. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339.
41. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). Powell is called the “Scottsboro Boys” case.
45. Id. at 48–49.
46. Id. at 49–50.
47. Id. at 49–50, 56.
48. Id. at 73.
49. Id. at 57.
50. Id.
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and judges function like machines, processing 100 defendants a day.51 The
Court in Powell stated that the right to counsel was one of the “immutable
principles of justice [that] inhere in the very idea of free government”52 and
that the duty to assign counsel was not discharged if the circumstances pre-
cluded effective aid in the preparation for and trial of the case: the “critical
stages.”53 The lack of meaningful representation in Powell was a denial of
due process in the eyes of the Court.54 The Supreme Court has not found
that situation again, yet public defenders see those impossible cases every
day. When every lawyer available for an indigent defendant is dealing with
caseloads above the ABA maximums, the chance that any of them could
provide “effective” assistance is negligible. We live in a world that the justices
who decided Powell would find unacceptable.55
In the decades following the recognition of the right to counsel, the
Supreme Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment also requires that
counsel be “effective.” In 1984 in Strickland v. Washington, the Court held
the standard for attorney performance is one of “reasonably effective assis-
tance.”56 To prove ineffectiveness, the Court articulated a two-part test. The
defendant must show that his57 attorney’s performance fell below an objec-
tively reasonable standard of effectiveness58 and that the error (or errors)
was so prejudicial that, but for it, the result would be different.59 The Court
51. See e.g., Norman S. Fletcher, Opinion, Georgia’s Dangerous Rush to Execution, N.Y.
Times (Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/05/opinion/georgias-dangerous-rush-
to-execution.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
52. 287 U.S. at 71 (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898)).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 71.
55. Following Powell, in Griffin v. Illinois the Supreme Court again stressed the impor-
tance of equality and the centrality to our constitutional system of a meaningful defense—
including the right to an appeal, regardless of income. See generally Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956). The plurality reasoned that while states were not constitutionally required to pro-
vide appellate review the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause protected prisoners
from invidious discrimination if states did. Id. at 18 (plurality opinion). Thus, states had an
affirmative duty to remedy inequalities preventing indigent defendants from accessing the ap-
pellate process: access to an appeal, if appeals existed, could not be dependent upon one’s
ability to pay. Id. at 19. In a sense, the decision imposed an affirmative duty on the govern-
ment even in the absence of proof that the inequalities being remedied were ones the govern-
ment had created. Justice Black said that within a criminal system a state “can no more
discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color.” Id. at 17. He
went on to say, “There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on
the amount of money he has.” Id. at 19.
56. 466 U.S. 668, 679–80 (1984).
57. The vast majority of criminal defendants are male. For U.S. residents born in 2001
(turning 18 in 2019), Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates indicate that one in nine men and
one in fifty-six women will serve some term of incarceration. Criminal Justice Facts, Sent’g
Project (2017), https://www.sentencingproject.org/criminal-justice-facts/ [https://perma.cc/
93YG-KWTG].
58. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 680–83.
59. Id. at 683–85.
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stressed the importance of the totality of circumstances in assessing effec-
tiveness and the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within rea-
sonable bounds.60 Since Strickland, the Court has consistently held that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires not only the assistance of de-
fense counsel at trial but also “effective” assistance at “all ‘critical’ stages of
the criminal proceedings.”61 “[T]he right to counsel is so fundamental to a
fair trial,” the Court has stated, that “the Constitution cannot tolerate trials
in which counsel, though present in name, is unable to assist the defendant
to obtain a fair decision on the merits.”62
The Strickland standard is hard to meet. It requires a showing of unrea-
sonable conduct by defense counsel and a showing that said unreasonable
conduct was a but-for cause of the conviction, plea, or sentence.63 Later pre-
cedent has further ratcheted up the prejudice prong. In Harrington v. Richter
the Court held the “likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not
just conceivable.”64 Implicitly, Strickland and its progeny require defendants
to be able to prove either a serious procedural defect (e.g., a misdemeanor
plea not taken)65 or their actual innocence. This concern was explicitly ad-
dressed in Kimmelman v. Morrison, where the Court held that the failure to
make a timely motion to suppress (a motion unrelated to actual innocence)
was deficient performance under Strickland.66 The Court noted that the
Sixth Amendment effective-assistance guarantee does not depend on guilt or
innocence.67
The Sixth Amendment doesn’t equivocate. If it is not interpreted to pro-
vide the same protections for the wrongly accused and the guilty, then our
system is deeply flawed. Lack of funding for trial-level defense,68 a nearly
insurmountable legal standard for constitutional ineffectiveness,69 and statu-
tory impediments to federal habeas review70 combine to ensure that only the
60. Id. at 680–83.
61. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786 (2009) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 227–28 (1967), and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)). The Court has also
held that failure to communicate official plea offers to a defendant facing felony charges was
ineffective assistance, and that the error was prejudicial because the defendant then pled guilty
to a felony, rather than a misdemeanor. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012).
62. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 395 (1985).
63. Lafler v. Cooper, 566, U.S. 156 (2012); Frye, 566 U.S. 134; Strickland, 466 U.S. 668.
64. 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011).
65. Frye, 566 U.S. 134.
66. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986). In Kimmelman, though the perform-
ance by the attorney was found to be deficient, the question of prejudice was remanded to the
court below.
67. Id. at 379–80.
68. See e.g., Benner, supra note 16.
69. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
70. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012). This statute, part of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act, restricts federal habeas review to state decisions “contrary to, or involv[ing]
an unreasonable application of . . . federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States.” Id. In doing so, it removes the ability of federal courts sitting in habeas to
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“actually innocent” and those who have faced egregious procedural defects
have a way to vindicate their Sixth Amendment rights. The Strickland analy-
sis does not take into account any of the systemic or structural deficiencies
that plague indigent defense systems or the criminal justice system at large.
Failure to interview certain witnesses, delays in interviewing others, and lack
of diligence in obtaining a criminal defendant’s pretrial release have not
been found to be constitutionally ineffective assistance71 in spite of the rela-
tionship of all of these factors to lack of time devoted to the case by defense
counsel. This is not the system envisioned by the text of the Sixth Amend-
ment or by the Court that decided Powell or Kimmelman.72
II. The Road Not Taken: Procedurally Ineffective Assistance
The Strickland standard combined with inadequate funding for indigent
defense is a toxic cocktail. Defense attorneys across the country are over-
whelmed by enormous caseloads that hinder constitutionally effective assis-
tance, yet the high bar for proving ineffective assistance precludes
meaningful recourse for their clients.73 State defendants are stuck: their law-
yers cannot provide the quality of representation necessary to keep them out
of jail or prison, but aren’t so ineffective as to merit a new trial. Further,
Congress and the Supreme Court have reduced the ability of federal courts
sitting in habeas to review state convictions for error.74 Without meaningful
error correction on the back end, adequate funding for trial counsel (to en-
sure that errors don’t occur in the first place) is critical. This Note proposes
that obtaining adequate funding for state indigent defense requires judicial
decisionmaking that induces state legislatures to solve the problem
themselves.
This Part describes a proposal for a different kind of ineffective assis-
tance claim, one that would empower judges to find counsel ineffective even
before trial. Section II.A first describes United States v. Cronic, a case where
the Supreme Court considered a procedural ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. This Section argues that the Court in Cronic gave litigants and judges
a weapon to combat extreme caseloads. It then lays out other cases where
courts have recognized claims that hint at such a procedural ineffectiveness
bar. Section II.B asserts that courts should treat the ABA caseload maxi-
mums as a strict limit for effective assistance in the context of a procedural
ineffective assistance claim.
correct errors at the state level and restricts their review only to the truly egregious cases that
are wrong as a matter of law.
71. United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In dissent, Judge Bazelon
relied on the ABA Standards Relation to Defense Function, and emphasized his inability to
accept a system that “conditions a defendant’s right to a fair trial on his ability to pay for it.”
Id. at 264 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
72. Kimmelman, 477 U.S. 365; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
73. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668.
74. See, e.g., § 2254.
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A. United States v. Cronic
On the same day that the Supreme Court decided Strickland v. Washing-
ton they also decided a companion case, United States v. Cronic.75 Cronic, like
Strickland, dealt with an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Cronic, how-
ever, arose in a pretrial context rather than in a habeas proceeding.76 The
question in Cronic dealt with the adequacy of defense counsel’s trial prepa-
ration.77 The defense attorney in Cronic only had twenty-five days to prepare
for trial. In contrast, the prosecution, a team of U.S. attorneys, had already
spent four-and-a-half years preparing.78 Cronic argued that the Court
should find that counsel’s performance in his case was ineffective because
twenty-five days simply wasn’t enough time to adequately prepare.79 In addi-
tion, Cronic argued that twenty-five days was particularly egregious in light
of Powell, which recognized the time between arraignment and trial as par-
ticularly important.80
The Supreme Court rejected this argument. Twenty-five days to prepare,
the Court said, did not amount to a finding of procedurally ineffective assis-
tance.81 The Court recognized, however, that there was some subset of cases
(like Powell)82 where no lawyer in the situation could possibly provide effec-
tive assistance of counsel.83 The Court established the standard for making a
successful pretrial ineffective assistance claim, holding that the presence of
certain systemic factors (or absence of necessary systemic factors) could lead
to constructive denial of counsel and the presumption of procedurally inef-
fective assistance.84 The Court stated that structurally sound indigent de-
fense systems require the early appointment of qualified attorneys with
sufficient time and resources to provide competent representation in order
to create a true adversarial criminal trial.85 The Court explicitly recognized
the degree to which ineffective assistance of counsel affects the fair-trial right
75. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
76. Id. Strickland dealt with a postconviction federal habeas claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel. 466 U.S. at 668. Now, Strickland covers postconviction ineffective assistance claims,
and Cronic governs pretrial ineffective assistance claims. The vast majority of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims are brought postconviction, so the vast majority are governed by
Strickland.
77. The exact critical stage identified in Powell. Powell, 287 U.S. at 56–58 (1932).
78. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 649. While Strickland was an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim coming out of state court (the federal court was sitting in habeas), Cronic dealt with an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim at the federal level, thus the U.S. attorneys’ involvement.
79. Id. at 652.
80. Powell, 287 U.S. at 57.
81. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 665.
82. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
83. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658–67.
84. Id. at 659–62 (citing Powell, 287 U.S. 45, as one such case).
85. Id. at 655–58.
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of the accused.86 Though procedural ineffectiveness was rejected in the con-
text of Cronic, the underlying premise, that there are systemic factors that
could preclude any lawyer from providing effective assistance, still stands.87
Since Cronic, courts have recognized that lack of adequate preparation
and investigation can be a constitutional bar to effective assistance of coun-
sel at sentencing. In Wiggins v. Smith and Williams v. Taylor the Supreme
Court held that failure to investigate mitigation evidence and failure to in-
troduce it constitutes ineffective assistance at capital sentencing.88 The peti-
tioner in Wiggins was convicted and sentenced to death for a 1988 murder.89
At his capital sentencing hearing his defense attorneys did not offer any evi-
dence of his abusive childhood as mitigation.90 The Court reasoned that
counsel’s failure to prepare a social history report91 was ineffective assis-
tance.92 In Williams, also a murder case, defense counsel failed to investigate
petitioner’s “nightmarish” childhood.93 Further, counsel did not introduce
any evidence of Williams’s excellent behavior while incarcerated nor evi-
dence that Williams was “borderline mentally retarded.”94 Defense counsel
that fails to investigate is not what the Constitution demands.95
Using a similar analysis, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
held that there was a high likelihood that indigent defendants would not
receive effective assistance of counsel because of lost opportunities for
prompt pretrial investigation stemming from high caseloads.96 Further, it
stated that courts are obligated to fashion prospective protections for consti-
tutional rights in order to avoid harms that would be “irremediable . . . if
not corrected.”97 When read within the Cronic framework, these cases could
establish a way for courts to find that indigent defense systems marked by
excessively high caseloads that lead to failures to investigate and prepare re-
sult in procedurally ineffective assistance.
Though the facts in Cronic did not rise to a constitutionally ineffective
level, Cronic was decided in 1984. The 25 days Cronic’s lawyers had to pre-
pare for his case dwarfs the 59 minutes, 32 minutes, and 7 minutes that
public defenders in Atlanta, Detroit, and New Orleans spent respectively on
86. Id. at 658.
87. Id. at 666–67.
88. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (failure to investigate); Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (failure to investigate and introduce available mitigation evidence).
89. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 514–15.
90. Id. at 524–26.
91. In Maryland, the state Wiggins was convicted in, a social history report was common
practice in capital cases. Id. at 524.
92. Id.
93. Williams, 529 U.S. at 395.
94. Id. at 395–96.
95. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533–36.
96. Lavallee v. Justices in Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895, 904–05 (Mass.
2004).
97. Id. at 905.
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each case on average in 2017.98 In 2007, only one-quarter of countywide
public defender offices and four out of 17 state-wide offices had caseloads
that fell within the ABA maximums.99 Courts could walk through the proce-
dural-ineffectiveness door that Cronic left open and find that attorneys with
excessively high caseloads are procedurally incapable of providing constitu-
tionally effective assistance. This would result in mistrials (if challenged
posttrial) and dismissals (if challenged pretrial). The inability to effectively
prosecute alleged criminals could incentivize localities to fund indigent de-
fense at levels high enough to hire the attorneys necessary to bring caseloads
back down.
B. The ABA Maximums As a Bar to Excessive Caseloads
If Cronic’s procedural ineffectiveness framework is to have any teeth,
there needs to be hard limits to caseloads that courts can use as a rule. This
poses a problem: there aren’t many available. The ABA Criminal Justice
Standards state (unhelpfully), “[d]efense counsel should not carry a wor-
kload that, by reason of its excessive size, interferes with the rendering of
quality representation, endangers the client’s interest in the speedy disposi-
tion of charges, or may lead to the breach of professional obligations.”100
The only hard numbers routinely accepted in the field are the maximum
annual caseloads created by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals (NAC) in 1973 and adopted by the ABA. The
limits are: 150 felony cases, 400 misdemeanor cases, 200 juvenile cases, or 25
appeals per full-time attorney.101 As of 2001, NAC is the only national body
that has quantified an annual maximum.102 The commission was appointed
by the administrator of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and
was made up of “elected officials, law enforcement officers, corrections offi-
cials, community leaders, prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys.”103
Though the standards were created in 1973, the ABA has noted that those
98. See Lee et al., supra note 36.
99. Public Defender Offices Nationwide Receive Nearly 5.6 Million Indigent Defense Cases
in 2007, Bureau Just. Stat. (Sept. 16, 2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/
spdpclpdo07pr.cfm [https://perma.cc/KN4P-THVF]. The year 2007 is the last year with Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics numbers. New numbers should be released sometime in 2018.
100. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense
Function § 4-1.3(e), at 126 (3d ed. 1993).
101. Am. Bar Ass’n Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, supra
note 24, at 5 n.19; National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, the
Defense (Black Letter), Nat’l Legal Aid & Defender Ass’n, http://www.nlada.org/defender-
standards/national-advisory-commission/black-letter [https://perma.cc/5UJZ-N8SC].
102. Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, NCJ 185632, Keeping De-
fender Workloads Manageable 8 (2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/185632.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X6WB-9LDR].
103. Id.
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numbers “have proven resilient over time.”104 The guideline numbers have
been cited as a maximum that “should in no event be exceeded.”105
Additionally, if anything, the standards are now too high. John Gross, of
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, told Mother Jones
that “[m]any [defense attorneys] don’t consider [the NAC standards] to be
realistic if you expect quality representation . . . . These standards were es-
tablished . . . when . . . criminal cases were a lot less complex.”106 On average,
Mother Jones estimates that a state public defender would need 3,035 work
hours (a year and a half) to do a single year’s work.107
The lack of other available standards and the fact that the ABA maxi-
mums are over forty years old both provide obvious counterarguments to
this proposal. The lack of alternative standards, however, doesn’t mean that
the ABA guidelines aren’t accurate. Some benchmark is necessary. Though
this proposal would transform ABA recommended maximums into hard
limits, reliance on these recommendations isn’t entirely without precedent: a
majority of the Supreme Court used ABA standards as a strict rule in deter-
mining the professional norms to assess the reasonableness of defense coun-
sels’ behavior in Wiggins v. Smith and Williams v. Taylor.108 Additionally,
Justice Kennedy, dissenting in Rompilla v. Beard, accused the majority of
relying on ABA guidelines as a bright-line rule.109
Finally, though the ABA maximums haven’t been updated, change
needs to start somewhere. These are the numbers we have. They might even
be too high, based on the complexity of modern cases.110 Systemic effective-
ness should be evaluated by whether attorneys’ caseloads fall within the na-
tional recommendations and by whether those attorneys were appointed
with enough time to participate fully in the critical stages of the proceed-
ings.111 Effective assistance of counsel should be about whether states have
truly met their procedural obligation to their citizens in providing indigent
defense; it shouldn’t be about whether the actual, substantive performance
by counsel was inadequate and whether that inadequacy was prejudicial.112
104. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Providing Defense Services § 5-5.3
cmt., at 72 (3d ed. 1992).
105. Am. Bar Ass’n Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, supra
note 24, at 2.
106. See Lee et al., supra note 36.
107. Id.
108. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. 510, 522, 524 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. 362,396 (2000).
109. 545 U.S. at 396, 400 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
110. See Lee et al., supra note 36.
111. See generally Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The court discussed how impor-
tant investigation and preparation was to the mounting of an effective defense, and how failure
to appoint counsel with enough time to do said investigation did not meet the standards set by
the Sixth Amendment.
112. Hurrell-Harring v. New York, 930 N.E.2d 217, 224–26 (N.Y. 2010).
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Time to complete “consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and prepara-
tion [is] vitally important.”113 Caseloads above the maximum national rec-
ommendation do not allow for that investigation or that preparation,114 and
they constructively deny defendants their Sixth Amendment right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel.
III. Procedurally Ineffective Assistance and Adequate
Indigent Defense Funding
The constructive denial of counsel for indigent defendants in state court
stems directly from lack of funding. “Poor training, perverse incentives, and
massive caseloads [among many other consequences] all stem from the lack
of resources devoted to criminal defense.”115 “[F]unding is conceivably re-
lated to every other problem in indigent defense.”116
This Part describes how the use of Cronic’s procedural ineffectiveness
framework by courts would incentivize state legislatures to devote more re-
sources to indigent defense, surveys state cases where litigants and courts
have already attempted to do so, and discusses some of the counterargu-
ments to such a regime.
Recognizing procedural ineffectiveness for caseloads higher than the
ABA maximums would bootstrap adequate indigent defense funding onto
the effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Sixth Amendment.117 If
assistance of counsel is procedurally ineffective when caseload limits aren’t
adhered to, then states and counties must adhere to those caseload limita-
tions, risk a constant threat of mistrials (if the claim was brought in a habeas
context), or risk an inability to try the defendant in the first place (for pre-
trial claims). Mistrials and the inability to go to trial ensure that there will be
waste in criminal justice systems. These outcomes require prosecutors to ei-
ther let a defendant go free or retry the case. The strain this would place on
criminal justice systems would incentivize states and counties to allocate
enough funding to indigent defense systems to maintain an adequate num-
ber of attorneys (or prosecute far, far, fewer crimes) in order to ensure that
attorneys maintain caseloads in accordance with the ABA maximums.
Litigants are attempting to bring attention to extreme caseloads, the im-
portance of adequate funding for state indigent defense systems, and judicial
options for incentivizing it. In 2016, the ACLU of Utah filed a class action
against the state of Utah for a failure to meet Sixth Amendment obligations
113. Powell, 287 U.S. at 57.
114. Lack of adequate preparation is ineffective assistance in this paradigm. Linking lack
of preparation to a condition of impossibly high caseloads is an extension of the logic of Powell
and bootstraps high caseloads onto the existing violation of lack of preparation.
115. Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Grieving Criminal Defense Lawyers, 70 Fordham
L. Rev. 1615, 1620 (2002).
116. Kyung M. Lee, Reinventing Gideon v. Wainwright: Holistic Defenders, Indigent De-
fendants, and the Right to Counsel, 31 Am. J. Crim. L. 367, 373 (2004).
117. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Gideon v. Wainright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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with regard to indigent defendants.118 The complaint alleged that the state
had failed to provide constitutionally adequate legal representation in viola-
tion of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.119
State courts have also begun to recognize systemic failures. In State v.
Peart, the Louisiana Supreme Court grappled with the state’s overburdened
and underfunded public defender system.120 The court found that Louisiana
had a “general pattern” of “chronic underfunding of indigent defense pro-
grams in most areas of the state” and that Louisiana’s system of funding
indigent defense through criminal- and traffic-ticket assessments was an un-
stable and unpredictable approach.121 The court further noted that the un-
derfunding that resulted from that system “ha[d] serious consequences.”122
These consequences included “excessive caseloads and insufficient support
[for attorneys].”123 Additionally, the court relied on the ABA maximums in
its assessment regarding caseloads.124
The Louisiana Supreme Court found that the conditions in the trial
court “routinely violate[d] the standards on workload; initial provision of
counsel; investigation; and others”125 (all of which relate to funding). Mr.
Peart’s case was remanded for a retrial,126 and the Louisiana Supreme Court
ordered the trial court to “apply a rebuttable presumption that indigents are
not receiving assistance of counsel sufficiently effective to meet constitution-
ally required standards.”127 The court found that “because of the excessive
caseloads . . . indigent defendants . . . are generally not provided with the
effective assistance of counsel the Constitution requires.”128 Finally, the court
stated:
If legislative action is not forthcoming and indigent defense reform does
not take place, this Court, in the exercise of its constitutional and inherent
power and supervisory jurisdiction, may find it necessary to employ the
more intrusive and specific measures it has thus far avoided to ensure that
indigent defendants receive reasonably effective assistance of counsel.129
State v. Peart is an example of a state court acknowledging gross inade-
quacies in the provision of indigent defense. It’s also an example of a way
118. See Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at
25, Remick v. Utah, No. 2:16-cv-00789, 2018 WL 1472484 (D. Utah Mar. 23, 2018), ECF No.
78 (dismissed on standing grounds) (noting, in spite of the dismissal, that Utah’s system of
indigent defense was “cause for concern”).
119. Id.
120. 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993).
121. Peart, 621 So. 2d at 789.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 790.
124. Id. at 789.
125. Id. (citations omitted).
126. Id. at 791–92.
127. Id. at 783.
128. Id. at 790.
129. Id. at 791.
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courts can mitigate any harms resulting from increased findings of ineffec-
tive assistance. In Peart, the court below was ordered to apply a rebuttable
presumption130 (rather than, for example, an irrebuttable presumption).
Peart shows that state courts as early as 1993 were aware of the role they
could play in reforming the provision of indigent defense. Further, Peart
directly tied the constitutional ineffectiveness in Louisiana’s indigent defense
system to inconsistent funding.131
State courts have also looked at high caseloads in contract-based indi-
gent defense systems. In State v. Smith, an Arizona case from 1984, a defen-
dant alleged that his defense attorney “spent only two to three hours
interviewing [him] and ‘possibly’ six to eight hours studying the case.”132 He
was charged with sexual assault, and the severity of the sentence led the
Arizona Supreme Court to expand the record to consider the adequacy of
the Mohave County indigent defense system.133 The court held that Mohave
County’s contract appointment system for indigent defense violated the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to both the United States and Arizona consti-
tutions even without finding that Mr. Smith was ineffectively represented.134
Mohave County used contract attorneys, rather than a public defender
system, for indigent defense. In the bid process for the contracts there was
“[n]o limitation . . . on caseload or hours, nor . . . any criteria for evaluating
ability or experience of potential applicants.”135 Contracts were assigned to
the lowest bidder136 in each category (the one exception being when the low-
est bidder was facing discipline by the state bar).137 The defense attorney in
Smith handled 149 felonies, 160 misdemeanors, 21 juvenile cases, and 33
other cases in 11 months.138 Further, that attorney handled all the Kingman
city appointment cases and his own private civil practice.139 The court stated
that it was “obvious that the caseload of defendant’s attorney was excessive,
if not crushing.”140 The court continued, “[i]n making this determination we
do not base our opinion on the standards alone, but also on our own experi-
ence as attorneys.”141
130. Id.
131. Id. at 789.
132. State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Ariz. 1984) (in banc). This case was decided the
same year as Strickland, so the court does not deal with the Strickland framework.
133. Id. at 1379.
134. Id. at 1381.
135. Id. at 1379.
136. Contract systems, generally, involve individual attorneys sending in bids to state
courts for a certain number of defense cases per year. They are often used in lieu of a state or
county public defender system. See generally Gershowitz, supra note 29.
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Further, the court went on to note just why high caseloads are such a
problem. The court stated, “[t]he insidiousness of overburdening defense
counsel is that it can result in concealing from the courts . . . the nature and
extent of damage that is done to defendants by their attorneys’ excessive
caseloads.”142
Smith demonstrates that state courts are willing to reconsider the effi-
cacy of many kinds of indigent defense delivery systems. It also shows that
state appellate courts are aware that crushing caseloads are not always evi-
dent to them. Finally, it serves as an example of a state supreme court explic-
itly stating that “excessive, if not crushing” caseloads lead to a denial of the
right to counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment.143 It ties underfunding
to the problem—the contract system failed because it ensured that the low-
est bidder received the contract with no regard for the different amounts of
time necessary for preparation for different kinds of cases based on com-
plexity.144 The solution proposed in this Note would provide state courts
with another tool to combat underfunding and the excessive caseloads that
stem from it. Unlike the gymnastics the court had to do in Smith, employing
the Cronic framework would provide a more direct jurisprudential route to
examining excessive caseloads and underfunding. The broad applicability of
the Cronic framework ensures that decisions like Smith could happen on a
much broader scale to incentivize funding reform.
There are two obvious, practical counterarguments to this proposal.
First, the sheer number of procedural ineffectiveness claims that could be
brought might entirely cripple the criminal justice system in many states and
counties. This can be addressed through limiting the procedural posture of
these claims. A claim of procedural ineffectiveness based on a caseload above
the ABA maximums could, theoretically, be brought either pretrial or in a
habeas context.145 In a habeas context, procedural ineffectiveness could func-
tion like a “step zero”146 to the Strickland analysis. Before a court even con-
sidered whether the attorney’s performance was reasonable or whether it
prejudiced the case, the court would consider whether counsel had a
caseload above the ABA maximum. If counsel did, that would trigger a pre-
sumption of prejudice, so all that the petitioner would have to prove is that
counsel acted objectively unreasonably. Bringing these claims in a habeas
context would allow defendants who have already been convicted to receive
the benefit of the rule. It would also result in countless mistrials in nearly
142. Id. at 1381.
143. Id. at 1380.
144. Id. at 1379–81.
145. Assuming that data regarding the attorney’s caseload at the time of representation
was available.
146. For a discussion of the “step zero” analysis implemented in cases following Chevron
U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), see Cass R. Sunstein,
Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187 (2006). See also Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212
(2002); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S.
576 (2000).
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every state system. This would exponentially increase the numbers of suc-
cessful ineffective assistance claims. On the one hand, that number of mistri-
als would provide a huge incentive to states to fund indigent defense systems
better. On the other, it would grossly overwhelm those systems.
Limiting a procedural ineffective assistance claim to the pretrial proce-
dural posture of Cronic itself would limit the amount of cases that could be
brought147 and thus would mitigate concerns about overwhelming state
criminal justice systems. Rather than inducing mistrials after the fact, this
would function as a bar to prosecution before trial ever occurred. It would
still affect enough prosecutions to send a message but would avoid the sheer
numbers of mistrials that could ensue if these cases were brought in a habeas
context.
The second practical counterargument is where the money would come
from. This isn’t insignificant. In New York state in 2013, it was estimated
that the cost to bring upstate caseloads to a “manageable level” (with “man-
ageable level” meaning within the ABA recommendations) would be $105
million.148 The money would come from state budgets—which, by necessity,
means money would be cut from services like police and fire departments,
road repairs, and schools. Every entitlement program a state or local govern-
ment creates, however, has this effect. Significantly, funding indigent defense
systems adequately is one of few state entitlements demanded by the Consti-
tution.149 Further, though the funding necessary to make state indigent de-
fense systems operate constitutionally within this framework is substantial,
the results would save states money. Poor-quality public defense systems in-
crease incarceration rates, and those increased rates lead to increased
costs.150 Between 1997 and 2007, the national cost of incarceration jumped
from $43 billion to $74 billion, and the number of people incarcerated na-
tionwide jumped from 1.7 million to 2.3 million.151 That number, 2.3 mil-
lion, has held steady through 2017.152 Of those 2.3 million people, state
147. Rather than opening up all cases that have ever been decided to ineffective assistance
claims, analogizing to Cronic’s procedural posture would limit the availability of this remedy to
only pending cases.
148. N.Y. State Office of Indigent Legal Servs., Estimate of the Cost of Compli-




149. Unlike, for example, public schools. There is no constitutional right to an education,
but there is one to effective assistance of counsel in a criminal proceeding. U.S. Const. amend.
VI.
150. Justice Policy Inst., System Overload 17–18 (2011), http://www.justicepolicy
.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/system_overload_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/YYZ5-
N76Q].
151. Id. at 17.
152. Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2017, Prison
Pol’y Initiative (March 14, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2017.html
[https://perma.cc/83PZ-YYAF].
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prisons and local jails hold 1.96 million.153 Spending more on indigent de-
fense would lead to lower rates of incarceration, which would actually save
states money in the long run.
There is, however, another option for states and counties unable or un-
willing to spend more on indigent defense. The same caseload reduction
could be achieved through fewer prosecutions. On the one hand, a targeted
approach to truly the “worst” offenders (focusing on serious felonies and
abandoning low-level, nonviolent misdemeanors)154 mitigates many of the
problems commentators have identified with mass incarceration, the
mechanical processing of misdemeanor defendants, and the criminal justice
system writ large.155 On the other, capping prosecutions is, in the eyes of
many, a detriment to the public good because it cripples unfettered
prosecutorial discretion.156 States and counties could play with both increas-
ing funding levels and creating prosecution caps as a way to bring caseloads
down in a manner tailored to their budgets and the needs of their
communities.
Conclusion
Giving defendants the option to bring pretrial ineffective assistance
claims based on excessive caseloads—and giving courts the ability to grant
relief—is necessary because indigent defense underfunding and correspond-
ing caseloads make it impossible for lawyers to fulfill their Sixth Amendment
obligations.157 This proposal would allow courts to assess the constitutional-
ity of indigent defense systems rather than limiting them to the review of
any individual lawyer’s performance. It would force states and counties to
maintain adequate funding or risk not being able to prosecute criminals at
all. In sum, it would transform the minimum amount of money that states
153. Id.
154. The percentage of state prison populations that is made up of nonviolent drug of-
fenders varies. In 2015, only slightly more than 10 percent of New York state’s prison popula-
tion was in for drug crimes. In Oklahoma, it was above 25 percent. Id. According to the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, through 2012 one in six people in state prison was incarcerated for
a drug conviction nationally. E. Ann Carson, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, NCJ 247282, Prisoners in 2013, at 15 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
p13.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FZG-EZY6].
155. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 Stan. L. Rev.
611, 613 (2014) (describing the rise of mass-misdemeanor justice and how it “upends standard
notions of the purposes of criminal procedure and punishment and challenges our under-
standings about the social role of criminal law”). See generally id.
156. See generally Stephanos Bibas, The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 Temp. Pol. &
C.R. L. Rev. 369 (2010) (arguing that prosecutorial discretion is essential for doing justice).
157. “About three out of every four county-funded public defender offices have attorney
caseloads which exceed nationally recognized maximum caseload standards.” Benner, supra
note 16, at 1. Of course, not every system in the country is failing. Federal defender offices
generally have the funding necessary to maintain manageable caseloads. David Rudovsky,
Gideon and the Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Rhetoric and the Reality, 32 L. & Ineq. 371,
376 (2014).
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and localities spend on criminal defense from a political question to a proce-
dural one.158
Using the door left open by Cronic to find procedurally ineffective assis-
tance of counsel when caseloads exceed the ABA maximums is just one of a
slew of proposals to increase indigent defense funding.159 It’s one of few,
however, that provides judges with a tool to create incentives for those fund-
ing increases, rather than relying on state legislatures to make better policy
in a vacuum.160 Empowering judges to do this is important. As Justice Bren-
nan objected in Wainwright v. Sykes, “most courts, [the Supreme Court]
included . . . have resisted any realistic inquiry into the competency of trial
counsel.”161 As later decisions show, courts are starting to inquire.162 Grant-
ing procedural ineffectiveness claims when defense attorneys have caseloads
above the ABA maximums would give judges a tool to push back against a
system that unfairly penalizes poor defendants for their inability to hire a
private lawyer. It would be a step towards fulfilling the promises made by
Gideon v. Wainwright and Strickland v. Washington and allow judges to take
an active role in improving the quality of defense representation in their
courtrooms.
158. But see William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 1 (1997) (treating defense funding as a political question).
159. See, e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, Litigation Strategies for Dealing with the
Indigent Defense Crisis (2010), https://www.acslaw.org/files/Primus%20-%20Litigation%
20Strategies.pdf [https://perma.cc/HJ7E-SZ6K] (proposing federal legislative initiatives to liti-
gate systemic right to counsel violations); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Searching for Solutions to the
Indigent Defense Crisis in the Broader Criminal Justice Reform Agenda, 122 Yale L.J. 2316
(2013) (arguing that integrating broader criminal justice reform principles into indigent de-
fense reform will reaffirm Gideon’s constitutional value).
160. Another proposal that empowers judges is raising the burden of proof in criminal
cases involving indigent defendants (making it harder to convict them). See Gershowitz, supra
note 29.
161. 433 U.S. 72, 117 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
162. See supra Part III.
